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Abstract 
We use a panel of euro area countries to assess the determinants of long-term sovereign 
bond yield spreads over the period 1999.01-2010.12. We find that, unlike the period 
preceding the global financial crisis, European government bond yield spreads are well-
explained by macro- and fiscal fundamentals over the crisis period. We also find that 
the menu of macro and fiscal risks priced by markets has been significantly enriched 
since March 2009, including the risk of the crisis’ transmission among EMU member 
states, international risk and liquidity risk. Finally, we find that sovereign credit ratings 
are statistically significant in explaining spreads, yet compared to macro- and fiscal 
fundamentals their role is limited.  
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Non-technical summary 
Following the 2008-2009 international financial crisis, and notably in the 
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in autumn 2008, fiscal imbalances 
increased in most European economies and the euro area in particular, reflecting the 
high fiscal cost of the measures taken to contain the fallout from the credit crisis. These 
developments have been followed by a sovereign debt crisis, which started from Greece 
in autumn 2009 and gradually engulfed the whole of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), particularly the so-called periphery EMU economies. Greece 
Ireland and Portugal were all forced in 2010-11 to resort to financial rescue schemes. 
These, however, failed to put a halt to the crisis. Not only all three countries remain, 
effectively, cut-off from international bond markets, but in the second half of 2011 
Spanish and Italian government bonds came under significant market pressure.  
In this paper we assess the determinants of long-term government bond yields in 
the euro area, paying particular emphasis in their changing composition over time. We 
employ a panel of ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) over the period 1999:01-2010:12 
(monthly data). We assess the role of an extended set of potential spreads’ determinants, 
namely macroeconomic and expected fiscal fundamentals, international risk, crisis’ 
transmission risk, liquidity conditions, and sovereign credit ratings. We consider three 
distinct time periods: first, the period preceding the global credit crunch (1999.01 – 
2007.07); second the period during which the global credit crunch had not yet mutated 
into a sovereign debt crisis (2007.08 – 2009.02); and third the period during which the 
global financial crisis mutated into a sovereign debt crisis (2009.03 – 2010.12).  
Our findings can be summarised as follows: i) the second principal component of 
yield spreads, including Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy, captures the risk 
involved in investing to periphery relative to core countries’ bonds. Starting from early 
2009, the two groups decoupled, with the risk of periphery countries relative to core 
ones increasing rapidly. The developing periphery crisis caused an increased risk of the 
crisis’ transmission among periphery countries, as well as from periphery to core 
countries since early 2010; ii) since August 2007 higher international risk is associated 
with higher spreads iii) since August 2007 yield spreads increase as a response to a 
slowdown in growth; iv) since March 2009 yield spreads are positively associated with 
real exchange rate appreciation and negatively associated with bond market liquidity; v) 
markets price fiscal risk, throughout the period under examination, through the fiscal 
balance. Since March 2009, however, they penalise fiscal imbalances more strongly, 
attaching an extra premium on the stock of projected public debt; vi) between summer 
2007 and spring 2009, the decrease in long-term debt issuance in most euro area 
countries was associated with lower yield spreads, while since March 2009 the 
relationship between the two variables reverses; vii) credit ratings are statistically 
significant in explaining spreads but their role is not critical. 
Overall, we find that, unlike the period preceding the global financial crisis, 
European government bond yield spreads are well-explained by macro- and fiscal 
fundamentals over the crisis period; that the menu of macro and fiscal risks priced by 
markets has been significantly enriched since March 2009, including the risk of the 
crisis’ transmission among EMU member states, international risk and liquidity risk; 
and that sovereign credit ratings are significant in explaining spreads, yet compared to 
macro- and fiscal fundamentals their role is limited.  
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1.  Introduction 
Following the 2008-2009 international financial crisis, and notably in the 
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in autumn 2008, fiscal imbalances 
increased in most European economies and the euro area in particular, reflecting the 
high fiscal cost of the measures taken to contain the fallout from the credit crisis. These 
developments have been followed by a sovereign debt crisis, which started from Greece 
in autumn 2009 and gradually engulfed the whole of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), particularly the so-called periphery EMU economies. With 
their government bond yields soaring, and following a series of credit rating 
downgrades, Greece Ireland and Portugal were forced in 2010-11 to resort to financial 
rescue schemes organised by the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the context of the newly-created 
mechanism, the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF). These rescue 
packages, however, failed to put a halt to the crisis. Not only all three countries remain, 
effectively, cut-off from international bond markets, but in the second half of 2011 
Spanish and Italian government bonds came under significant market pressure.  
In response to the European sovereign debt crisis, a number of recent empirical 
studies have attempted to identify the factors affecting EMU government bonds yields 
spreads. This previous literature (see section two), has explained the crisis on the basis 
of a transfer of global financial risk to sovereign bonds through banking bailout 
schemes (Acharya et al., 2011); changing private expectations regarding the probability 
of default risk and/or a country’s exit from the euro (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011), 
leading to a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model 
before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk 
thereafter (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012); increased attention to fiscal developments. 
(Afonso, 2010); contagion effects (De Santis, 2012) and sovereign credit ratings events 
(Afonso et al., 2012).  
In this study we investigate the determinants of European government bond yield 
spreads against Germany, the variable typically used by investors and policy makers to 
assess the spread and intensity of the European debt crisis.  Our analysis focuses onto 
the extent to which the determination of spreads has changed before and after the onset 
of the crisis, as well as during different stages of the crisis. More specifically, we 
differentiate between three distinct time periods: first, the period preceding the global 
credit crunch (1999.01 – 2007.07); second the period during which the global credit 
. 
 
 5 
crunch had not yet mutated into a sovereign debt crisis (2007.08 – 2009.02); and third 
the period during which the global financial crisis mutated into a sovereign debt crisis 
(2009.03 – 2010.12). Compared to existing studies, we use a widened set of 
fundamentals enabling us to capture further insights, some of which are unreported in 
the previous literature, relevant to the factors determining sovereign spreads in the euro 
area. These include macroeconomic and expected fiscal fundamentals, international 
risk, liquidity conditions and the risk of the crisis’ transmission among EMU member 
states, which we capture using principal components analysis as in Longstaff et al. 
(2011).  
We employ a panel of ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) over the period 1999:01-
2010:12 (monthly data). Our findings can be summarised as follows: i) the second 
principal component of yield spreads, including Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and 
Italy, captures the risk involved in investing to periphery relative to core countries’ 
bonds. Starting from early 2009, the two groups decoupled, with the risk of periphery 
countries relative to core ones increasing rapidly. The developing periphery crisis 
caused an increased risk of the crisis’ transmission among periphery countries, as well 
as from periphery to core countries since early 2010; ii) since August 2007 higher 
international financial risk is associated with higher spreads iii) since August 2007 yield 
spreads increase as a response to a slowdown in growth; iv) since March 2009 yield 
spreads are positively associated with real exchange rate appreciation and negatively 
associated with bond market liquidity; v) markets price fiscal risk, throughout the period 
under examination, through the fiscal balance. Since March 2009, however, they 
penalise fiscal imbalances more strongly, attaching an extra premium on the stock of 
projected public debt; vi) between summer 2007 and spring 2009, the decrease in long-
term debt issuance in most euro area countries was associated with lower yield spreads, 
while since March 2009 the relationship between the two variables reverses; vii) credit 
ratings are statistically significant in explaining spreads but their role is not critical. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two reviews the 
related literature on the determinants of euro area sovereign spreads before and during 
the European debt crisis; section three presents and discusses our dataset, methodology, 
and empirical results; section four concludes. 
. 
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2.  Related literature 
Existing studies on EMU government bond yields, or their spread against 
Germany, fall into two broad categories, respectively covering the period prior to and 
following the global financial crisis. Both groups of studies typically follow the general 
literature on government bond yields modelling the latter on three main variables (see 
e.g. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009):  First, an international risk factor capturing the 
level of perceived financial risk and its unit price. Typically, this is empirically 
approximated using indexes of US stock market implied volatility or the spread between 
the yields of US corporate bonds against US treasury bills. Second, credit risk, 
reflecting the probability of default on behalf of a sovereign borrower, typically 
approximated using indicators of past or projections of future fiscal performance. 
Indeed, existing evidence suggests that markets attach additional risks to the loosening 
of observed fiscal positions (see e.g. Ardagna et al., 2004; Afonso and Rault, 2010) and 
shifts in fiscal policy expectations (see e.g. Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999). Third, 
government bond yields are linked to liquidity risk. This source of risk refers to the size 
and depth of the sovereign bonds market and captures the possibility of capital losses 
due to early liquidation or significant price reductions resulting from a small number of 
transactions. Liquidity is a variable particularly difficult to measure empirically, usually 
approximated using bid-ask spreads, transaction volumes and the level of or the share of 
a country’s debt in global/EMU-wide sovereign debt (see e.g. Favero et al., 2010, 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012).  
The literature on European government bonds for the period preceding the global 
credit crunch is not unanimous regarding the role of each of the three variables 
discussed above. Having said so, the balance of reported evidence leads to the following 
conclusions: First, prior to summer 2007 the international risk factor was an important 
determinant of bond yields and spreads, as suggested by studies including Codogno et 
al. (2003), Geyer et al. (2004), Barrios et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Favero et al. (2010). This effect was stronger 
during periods of tightening international financial conditions (see e.g. Haugh et al., 
2009; Barrios et al., 2009) and more prominent in countries with high levels of public 
debt (see e.g. Codogno et al., 2003). 
 Second, sovereign credit risk was priced in government bond yields, as suggested 
by Codogno et al. (2003), Faini (2006), Bernoth et al. (2004), Bernoth and Wolff 
(2008), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Schuknecht et al. (2009).  Bernoth and 
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Wolff (2008) and Schuknecht et al. (2009) interpret this finding as evidence that the 
Stability and Growth Pact operated as credible mechanism enforcing fiscal discipline 
among EMU members. This interpretation, however, has been contested by Manganelli 
and Wolswijk (2009), who suggest that the penalties imposed by markets were not 
sufficiently high to prevent unsustainable national fiscal policies. Similarly, Afonso and 
Strauch (2007) report that the fiscal policy events in 2002 in the EU had only small 
effects on government bond yield spreads, while Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) find that 
the effect of fiscal performance on EMU sovereign bond yields has weakened following 
the euro’s introduction. Overall, default risk in the EMU context has been seen in the 
past, at least before the global financial crisis, to be present but rather subdued (see e.g. 
Bernoth et al., 2004).  
Finally, the effect of liquidity risk for the period preceding the global financial 
crisis is disputed. Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004), Pagano and Von 
Thadden (2004), and Jankowitsch et al. (2006) find a limited and declining liquidity 
effect on EMU spreads. On the other hand, Gomez-Puig (2006), Beber et al. (2009), and 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) find that liquidity was an important determinant of 
yields spreads. Liquidity effects are found to be stronger during periods of tightening 
financial conditions and higher interest rates, during which market participants are 
willing to trade lower yields for higher sovereign debt liquidity.
1
  
There is a growing literature on EMU sovereign bond during the current period of 
financial turmoil. More specifically, existing studies share two common findings.  First, 
the observed widening in EMU spreads is largely driven by the increased international 
risk factor.
2
 In this process, the role of domestic banking sectors is crucial, as suggested 
by Candelon and Palm (2010), Gerlach et al. (2010) and Acharya et al. (2011).
3
 
International banking risk appears to have been transformed into sovereign risk through 
                                                          
1
 Favero et al. (2010), on the other hand, provide theoretical justification and empirical evidence 
according to which during the early EMU-years liquidity had a smaller effect on sovereign spreads in 
periods of high risk. This is explained by the fact that in crisis periods investors choose from a reduced set 
of alterative investment opportunities, limiting their willingness to move away from sovereign bonds.  
2
 Holló et al. (2012) develop a comprehensive indicator of financial stress for the EMU composed using 
information from numerous financial markets, covering the period 1987-2010. Their findings suggest an 
unprecendented increase in financial systemic risk in the euro area since mid-2007, whose peak coincides 
with the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers crisis.  
3
 An important feature of the model by Acharya et al. (2011) is its prediction of the existence of two-way 
causality between financial and sovereign debt crisis. They show theoretically the existence of a feedback 
contagion effect, running from sovereign credit risk to financial risk, which they explain on the basis of a 
loss of value in the financial sector’s holdings of sovereign bonds, as well as the value of any implicit 
and/or explicit government guarantees to the financial sector as a form of bailout. Acharya et al. (2011) 
present empirical evidence supporting the existence of this feedback effect.  
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three channels. First, shortages in banking liquidity restricted credit to the private sector 
causing economic recession and increasing fiscal imbalances. Second, governments 
were obliged to recapitalise banks using public money increasing fiscal liabilities 
further. In relation to this, if bank bailouts are perceived to be (even partly) financed 
through future taxation, they reduce the non-financial sector’s incentives to invest, 
hurting growth and, implicitly, expected future public revenue. Finally, the 
announcement of a banking bailout itself lowers the price of government debt due to the 
anticipated dilution from newly issued debt. With national banking sectors having 
different degrees of exposure to international financial conditions the increase in the 
common international risk factor causes a heterogeneous impact on national spreads. 
Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), Mody (2009), Barrios et al. (2009), 
Gerlach et al. (2010), Schuknecht et al. (2010), Caceres et al. (2010) and Acharya et al. 
(2011) have all established the importance of the international risk factor during the 
crisis period and its impact on the latter through the financial/banking sector.  
The second point of consensus is that during the crisis period markets have been 
penalising fiscal and other macro-imbalances much more heavily than before. 
According to Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), unlike the pre-crisis period, when 
markets did not price macro-fundamentals (with the possible exception of expected 
budget deficits) and the international risk factor, during the crisis period markets have 
been pricing both factors, and several factors, notably fiscally related, have become 
relevant determinants of spreads. Similar findings are obtained by Bernoth and Erdogan 
(2010). Furthermore, markets not only attach a higher weight on fiscal imbalances, but 
they also price their interaction with the international risk factor (see e.g. Barrios et al., 
2009; Haugh et al., 2009; Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Schuknecht et al., 2010). 
Increased focus on heterogeneous fiscal performance/outlook and the latter’s interaction 
with the international risk factor is another major factor explaining the differential 
spread increases observed among EMU countries (see Favero and Missale, 2011).  
Moreover, the literature has uncovered important cross-country contagion/spill-
over effects among several euro countries both in the market for sovereign EMU bonds 
and Credit Default Swaps (CDS), particularly in the case of less well-rated sovereigns 
(see e.g. Caceres et al. 2010; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De Santis, 2012; Favero 
and Missale, 2011). The European sovereign debt crisis has also caused spill-over 
effects to the exchange rate of the euro versus the US dollar (see Hui and Chung, 2011). 
By contrast, and in line with the pre-crisis period, the evidence suggests a rather limited 
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role for country-specific liquidity risk (see e.g. Attinasi et al., 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 
2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Haugh et al., 2009; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De 
Santis, 2012;  Favero and Missale, 2011). 
Finally, recent studies have investigated the impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
EMU sovereign bond yields. Afonso et al. (2012) find notably significant responses of 
government bond yield spreads to changes in rating notations and outlook (from 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch), particularly in the case of negative 
announcements. In addition, rating announcements in so-called event countries affect 
more significantly sovereign yields in non-event countries when the sovereign rating of 
the event country is lower than those of non-event countries. Therefore, such spill-over 
effects run from lower rated countries to higher rated countries. Similar findings, 
confirming the significance of sovereign credit agencies in determining yields in the 
market for CDS on EMU sovereign bonds, as well as the existence of substantial spill-
over effects both across countries and financial markets, are presented by Arezki et al. 
(2011) and De Santis (2012).  
 
3.  Analysis 
3.1.  Methodology 
We use a unified framework of analysis capturing simultaneously and extending 
the insights of the studies by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Afonso et al. (2012). 
In its simplest version the proposed specification to assess the potential determinants of 
the sovereign long-term bond yields can be written as: 
 
sprit = a + 1sprit-1 + 2vixt + 3bait + 4balanceit +  5debtit + 6qit + 7gindit   
             + 8pc2t + γi + it.                 (1) 
 
Equation (1) models the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany, 
sprit, on the international risk factor, bond market liquidity conditions, macroeconomic 
and fiscal fundamentals, and contagion effects incorporating country-specific fixed 
effects (γi). To account for endogeneity between spreads and the explanatory variables 
we estimate equation (1) using the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method with cross-
section weights which account for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.
4
 Following 
                                                          
4
 An alternative panel estimation approach, the Arrelano and Bond GMM method, is more appropriate to 
cases where the panel is characterised by a large number of cross-sections and a small number of time-
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standard practice in the empirical literature on EMU Equation(1) includes lagged 
spreads to account for spreads persistence (see also Gerlach et al., 2010). As Hallerberg 
and Wolff (2008) explain, while the persistent nature of spreads implies that the 
exclusion of the lagged spread term from the model will generate omitted variable bias, 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor generates a different bias since 
the latter variable is correlated with the fixed effects (see Nickell, 1981). Nevertheless, 
as Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) point out, the latter bias declines as the time-series 
dimension of the panel (T) increases and becomes quite small once T reaches 20. As in 
our sample T = 144 we expect any bias introduced by the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable to be very small and in all likelihood smaller than the omitted 
variables bias that would arise by its exclusion. However, in the robustness tests that 
follow our estimations, we have also estimated the base line model excluding the lagged 
spread term. The results, as we shall see in section 3.4 below, remain qualitatively very 
similar.  
vixt is the logarithm of the S&P 500 implied stock market volatility index (VIX), 
our proxy for the international risk factor. The VIX, often called the ‘investor fear 
gauge’ since it tends to spike during market turmoil periods (Whaley, 2000), is a 
reasonable proxy for  international financial risk (Mody, 2009) and has been extensively 
used in the literature on euro area government bond spreads (see e.g. Beber et al., 2009) 
and Gerlach et al., 2010).
5
 We expect a higher (lower) value for the international risk 
factor to cause an increase (reduction) in government bond spreads.  
bait denotes the 10 year government bond bid-ask spread. This is our measure of 
bond market illiquidity, with a higher (lower) value of this spread indicating a fall 
(increase) in liquidity leading to an increase (reduction) in government bond yield 
spreads. Bid-ask spreads are used to capture liquidity effects in EMU sovereign bond 
markets by  a number of previous studies including Barrios et al. (2009), Favero et al. 
(2010), Gerlach et al. (2010), and Bernoth and Erdogan (2010).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
series observations, that is, the opposite case of the type of panel that we work with (see also Barrios et 
al., 2009). All reported models have also been estimated using the Feasible Generalised Least Squares 
(FGLS) method, with cross-section weights which accounting for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity (see 
also Attinasi et al., 2009). The FGLS results (available upon request) do not differ significantly from the 
2SLS results. 
5
 The VIX is constructed using call- and put-implied volatilities from the S&P 500 index 30-day options. 
Implied volatility measures are forward-looking, as opposed to historical volatility measures which are 
backward-looking Econometric analysis using regime-switching models in IMF (2003) suggests that 
‘flight-to-quality’ periods and high levels of the VIX tend to coincide.  
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balanceit and debtit denote the expected fiscal position variables, namely, the 
expected (one-year ahead) government budget balance-to-GDP ratio and the expected 
government debt-to-GDP ratio, respectively, both measured as differentials versus 
Germany.
 
The expected fiscal position provides a proxy for credit quality, with an 
expected fiscal deterioration implying higher risk. The utilisation of expected, as 
opposed to historical fiscal data, is in line with a number of recent studies on EMU 
government bond yield spreads including Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), 
Gerlach et al. (2010) and Favero and Missale (2011). We expect a higher (lower) value 
for the expected government budget balance to reduce (increase) spreads; while higher 
(lower) expected public debt should cause an increase (reduction) in spreads.   
qit is the log of the real effective exchange rate. This variable generally captures 
credit risk originating from general macroeconomic disequilibrium although, and given 
the inclusion in equation (1) of variables specifically capturing fiscal fundamentals and 
growth conditions (see below), in our specification it may be mainly capturing external 
competitiveness. An increase (reduction) in q denotes real exchange rate appreciation 
(depreciation), which is expected to increase (reduce) spreads as theoretically justified 
by the analysis of Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011).
6
 The empirical significance of real 
exchange rates in explaining spreads in the EMU area has been confirmed by Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas (2012). In the empirical specification shown above, we use trade-
weighted real exchange rates calculated against our sample countries’ main trading 
partners. As Germany is the main trading partner of all countries included in our panel, 
the level of the real effective exchange rate qit captures the effect of relative productivity 
shocks against Germany, as well as the shocks relative to the remaining trading 
partners. However, in our robustness tests, we also estimate our baseline model using 
                                                          
6
 Using insights from the literature on currency crises (see Obstfeld, 1996 and Krugman, 1998) these 
authors treat euro-participation as a form of fixed-exchange rate regime. They assume a rational 
government whose control variable is the decision to stay in or exit the euro. Depending on the 
expectations status of rational private sector, the government decides its optimal policy action (stay in or 
leave the euro) by balancing the costs of its two policy options. This cost is reflected in the interest rate 
differential (spread) on public debt relative to the EMU average or a benchmark country. The cost of 
exiting the euro is a positive constant, reflecting the difference between the steady-state inflation under 
monetary independence and continued EMU participation giving rise, through the Fisher equation, to a 
constant positive interest rate spread. As in Obstfeld (1996), the cost of staying in the euro is a positive 
quadratic function of the deviation of the log-exchange rate at which the country has joined the euro from 
the PPP-consistent log-exchange rate. This deviation captures the degree of macroeconomic imbalances 
and is measured by the value of the real exchange rate, hence the latter’s inclusion in our empirical 
specification. The model predicts that a deterioration in macro-imbalances and/or shifts in private 
expectations, either regarding future EMU participation or the availability of fiscal guarantees from other 
member-states, can result in rational EMU exit, which in the case of shifts in expectations, may take the 
form of a self-fulfilling prophesy.  
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the real exchange rate differential against Germany (qdit), given by the difference 
between the log of a country’s real effective exchange rate and the log of the German 
real effective exchange rate. As we report in section 3.4 below, this does not affect our 
results.  
gindit is the annual growth rate of industrial production (differential versus 
Germany). This variable is used as a proxy for the effects of economic growth on 
spreads, capturing the argument by Alesina et al. (1992) according to which sovereign 
debt becomes riskier during periods of economic slowdown (see also Bernoth et al., 
2004). Therefore, an increase (reduction) in growth performance is assumed to improve 
(deteriorate) credit worthiness reducing (increasing) government bond spreads.  
Finally, pc2t denotes our proxy for the effects caused by the transmission of the 
sovereign debt crisis within the group of periphery countries and from the periphery to 
core countries. This proxy is derived using principal components analysis on 
government bond yields spreads (see Longstaff et al., 2011) and is fully explained in 
Section 3.3 below. If such transmission effects are present, an increase (reduction) in 
pc2t should increase (reduce) spread values.  
After estimating the baseline model given by equation (1) we extend it by adding 
variables aiming to capture further insights relating to the movements of spreads within 
the EMU area. First, we consider the role of the share of long-term general government 
debt (defined as debt maturing at least after one year) in total general government debt. 
The rational for adding this variable (ltsdebtit) is that all else equal, a country with a 
large stock of debt maturing in the near future might be considered less credit-worthy 
compared to a country whose debt repayment is scheduled in the more distant future. 
Second, we allow the expected debt to GDP ratio differential versus Germany to enter 
in the second power (debit
2
) to capture possible non-linear effects of expected fiscal 
performance on government bond spreads, as suggested by Bernoth et al. (2004) and 
Bernoth and Erdogan (2010).  
Third, we allow for the effect of a multiplicative term capturing the interaction 
between past spread movements and illiquidity conditions (see Llorente et al., 2002). 
Given that sovereign bond yield spreads and bid-ask spreads are highly positively 
correlated,
7
 the product of the two variables typically increases (declines) because both 
terms increase (decline). Therefore, the multiplicative term (sprit-1*bait-1) can be 
                                                          
7
 In the panel used for our estimations the correlation coefficient between sovereign bond yields spreads 
and bid-ask spreads is 0.77.  
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interpreted as a stress indicator for bond markets, since a rise is associated with falling 
bond prices and higher illiquidity. Assuming, as it is the case in recent months for EMU 
countries, an increase in spreads and illiquidity, a positive coefficient for (sprit-1*bait-1) 
would indicate the existence of market forces pushing bond prices below their 
equilibrium value, as this is determined by the remaining spreads’ determinants. This 
would be consistent with (though not definitely proving) speculation trading pushing 
bond prices below their fair value.  
On the other hand, and assuming the same tightening market conditions, a 
negative coefficient for (sprit-1*bait-1) would indicate the existence of market forces 
pushing bond prices above their equilibrium value, as this is determined by the 
remaining spreads’ determinants. This could be consistent with bond purchases 
originating from two possible sources: (a) purchases by private agents, speculating that 
the rest of market participants have underpriced the fair value of bonds, which they 
proceed to buy in anticipation of a future increase in their value. This movement would 
reduce market pressure on bonds; (b) bond purchases by institutional investors, in an 
effort to mitigate the effect of private sales and prevent a collapse of the bonds’ market. 
Whatever the source of such bond purchases, a negative sign for the multiplicative term 
(sprit-1*bait-1) would not be consistent with speculation of the former (detrimental) kind 
that increases spreads beyond the level justified by their fundamentals.  
Fourth, we account for the role of sovereign credit ratings/announcements on 
government bond spreads, denoted by averageratingit and averageoutlookit  respectively. 
This allows us to assess the effect of credit ratings/announcements on government bond 
spreads, which is above and beyond the information that markets have already priced 
through observation of the remaining determinants of spreads. In a fully efficient 
(strong-form) market, credit ratings and outlook announcements should not affect 
bonds’ prices, therefore their coefficients should equal zero. If, however, markets are 
efficient only in the semi-strong form, credit ratings and credit announcements may be 
treated by markets as revealing information, which was previously private to credit 
rating agencies. In other words, we test whether sovereign credit ratings announcements 
convey some kind of information that the market treats as news. 
Overall in its most general form our empirical model of spreads takes the form 
of equation (2) below:  
 
 
. 
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sprit = a + 1sprit-1 + 2vixt + 3bait + 4balanceit + 5debtit + 6qit + 7gindit   
+ 8pc2t + 9ltsdebtit + 10debtit
2 
+ 11sprit-1bait-1 + 12averageratingit                         
+  13averageoutlookit + γi + it .       (2) 
 
After estimating equations (1) and (2) which relate spreads to their underlying 
fundamentals under the assumption that these relationships have remained stable over 
time, we proceed by accounting for the possibility of structural change during the crisis 
period. In particular, we allow for two structural breaks in the relationship between 
spreads and their aforementioned potential determinants, using slope dummy variables. 
The first dummy variable (D2007.08t) aims to capture the effects of the global financial 
crisis specified to begin in August 2007. This date is widely acknowledged in the 
literature to be the starting point of the global credit crunch given that the first large 
emergency loan that the ECB provided to European banks in response to increasing 
pressures in the interbank market took place on 9/8/2007 (see also Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas, 2012; Attinasi et al., 2009). 
  The second dummy variable (D2009.03t) intends to capture the point in time 
when the global credit crisis started being transformed into the European sovereign debt 
crisis. We date this development back to March 2009 for two reasons. First, the most 
intense period of the credit crisis was over by the spring of 2009 with major stock 
market indices experiencing their lowest levels in early March 2009 and since then 
recording significant gains. Second, by spring 2009 the cost of fiscal activism and the 
bank bailout packages that were implemented during the credit crisis period became 
apparent. The very substantial revision of projected public debt in the spring of 2009, an 
increase of 19% on average across euro area members according to ECFIN data, defines 
a key point in the European debt crisis, as markets were made officially aware of these 
costs. As we explain in section 3.2 below, the effect of these events are strikingly 
apparent in expected fiscal balances and public debt to GDP ratios, with both series 
registering a sharp step-increase in March 2009. This renders the choice of March 2009 
as marking the beginning of a new phase in the EMU sovereign debt a data-driven one.  
 
3.2.  Data and stylised facts 
We employ a panel of ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), measured in a monthly 
. 
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frequency, over the time period 1999:01-2010:12.
8
 The data sources and definition of 
the variables can be seen in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
Figure 1 presents the 10-year euro area government bond yield spreads. Before 
the economic and financial crisis of 2007-8, spreads against Germany had stabilised at 
very low levels despite deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals in many countries. 
During the credit crisis all euro area economies experienced a large increase in their 
spread versus Germany. German government bonds operated as a ‘flight-to-quality’ 
asset during the crisis putting an upward pressure in all euro area government bond 
yield spreads. This ‘flight-to-quality’ feature of German bonds is apparent in Figure 2, 
which plots the 10-year German yield together with the general indicator of common 
international risk, the VIX. Figure 2 shows that during the peak of the credit crisis in the 
autumn of 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the VIX increased sharply 
while the 10-year German government bond yield plummeted as investors flock to the 
perceived safety of German bonds.  
[Figures 1, 2] 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the transformation of the credit crisis into a sovereign 
debt crisis with euro area governments expected fiscal position deteriorating sharply in 
early 2009.
9
 The fiscal deterioration reflects lower tax revenues for the euro area 
governments, due to the economic contraction, as well to the fiscal stimulus packages 
that were implemented to prevent further deterioration. Furthermore, governments faced 
the additional major fiscal cost of having to support the financial sector, via significant 
capital injections in the euro area banks’ balance sheets, provision of guarantees, such 
as the Irish government bank guarantee scheme (29/09/2008), and outright purchases of 
assets from banks.
10
  
[Figure 3, 4] 
Finally, Figures 5 and 6 link present information on credit ratings and their link 
to the European sovereign debt crisis. We use data on euro area sovereign debt credit 
rating and credit outlook from each of the three main rating agencies, Standard and 
                                                          
8
 We exclude Luxembourg, where the outstanding government debt and the associated market are very 
small, as well as the countries that joined the euro since 2008 (Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
9
 These forecasts are produced by the European Comission’s DG ECFIN twice a year (spring and 
autumn).  
10
 Sgherri and Zoli (2009) argue that the discretionary euro-area fiscal stimulus is estimated to have been 
around 1.1 and 0.9 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. They also point out that the immediate 
euro-area fiscal cost of the banks’ support measures is, on average, around 3.5 percent of (2008) GDP. 
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Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, as well as for the simple average rating calculated using 
rating scores from all three agencies. Following existing literature (see e.g. Gande and 
Parsley, 2005; Afonso et al. 2012), we transform sovereign credit rating scores into the 
linear scale presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.
11
 A worse sovereign credit rating 
should be perceived by the markets as implying higher credit risk, therefore having an 
upward effect on the yield spread. Indeed, as Figures 5 and 6 indicate, the significant 
deterioration in the expected fiscal position in early 2009 was soon followed by 
downgrades of periphery euro area government debt and liquidity withdrawal, marking 
the escalation of the euro area debt crisis.  
[Figure 5, 6] 
 
3.3.  Measuring transmission effects  
An important feature of the recent movements of government bond yield spreads 
in the euro area is the dichotomy observed between core and periphery EMU countries. 
Following the spike in all countries’ spreads at the height of the global credit crunch, 
the spreads of the core group have been relatively stable albeit at levels higher 
compared to those of the pre-crisis period. At the same time, following a temporary 
reduction in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers crisis, the spreads of the 
periphery group have been on an ascending path. This core-periphery divergence raises 
the possibility of transmission of the sovereign debt crisis within the euro area 
members. We define transmission as the increase in the spread of any given EMU 
country due to the markets discounting worsened future fiscal and/or macro 
fundamentals for that country, after having observed an increased probability of default 
in another EMU country, reflected in higher spreads for that second country. 
Transmission can take place both from periphery to core countries, as well as within 
periphery countries and is ultimately linked to the periphery-core divergence through 
the following channels. 
First, increasing core-periphery divergence, denoting increased probability of 
default and/or euro exit in one or more countries of the periphery group signals an 
increased probability of possible future sovereign rescues, ultimately to be funded by 
non-default countries. Given the superior state of their fiscal fundamentals, the latter are 
more likely to be members of the core group. Therefore, increasing core-periphery 
                                                          
11
 See Afonso et al. (2011) for details on the construction of the rating scales presented in Table A2 in the 
Appendix.  
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divergence signals an increased probability of aggregating fiscal risks at the EU-level, 
and increased future borrowing requirements from the core group to cover the potential 
support efforts. Through this channel, increasing core-periphery divergence may cause 
transmission of the crisis from the periphery group to the core group.   
Second, increased probability of default and/or euro exit in one periphery country, 
reflected in the widening of its spread versus the core group, may operate as a trigger 
for fears of subsequent default and/or euro exit in another periphery country (the so-
called domino effect). Hence, increasing core-periphery divergence caused by increased 
spreads in a specific periphery country may cause precautionary capital flight in other 
periphery countries, leading to a tighter credit environment and deteriorating growth 
expectations. These, in turn, can cause deteriorating expectations about future fiscal 
performance increasing credit risk through the channels linking banking risk with 
sovereign risk discussed in the literature review section. Through this channel, 
increasing core-periphery divergence may cause transmission of the crisis from one 
periphery country to another.   
To test the transmission hypothesis we need a quantitative measure of transmission 
risk which we pursue through a principal components analysis, In a nutshell, the 
principal components are uncorrelated linear combinations of the original variables, 
which are then ranked by their variances in descending order. Principal components 
analysis on government bond spreads allows us to capture both the percentage of data 
variation due to global co-movement across all spreads, as well as the variation of data 
explained by the movement of one group of countries against another (see Longstaff et 
al., 2011).  
The results from such analysis are presented in Table 1. Interestingly, the reported 
eigenvalues and the cumulative proportion figures suggest that the variance of the 
spreads is essentially captured by the first two principal components. Those two 
components explain around 97% of the variation of the full variable set. This also 
implies that we only take into account the components whose associated eigenvalues are 
above 0.7, a rule suggested by Jollife (1972). 
[Table 1] 
 The first component can be interpreted as an EMU-wide indicator of sovereign 
risk (roughly a general index of spreads) since it incorporates all EMU national spreads 
with all countries entering with approximately equal weights. The second component 
differentiates between two groups of countries, with the two groups distinguished by the 
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sign of the reported weights. Table 1 suggests that the first group (denoted by a positive 
sign) includes Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, France and, marginally, Belgium. The 
second group (denoted by a negative sign) includes Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and 
Italy. The absolute size of the reported weights is indicative of the markets’ perception 
regarding the definitiveness of a country’s position within its group. The country 
composition of the two groups identified by the second principal component coincides 
with the core- and periphery-groups widely assumed to exist within the euro area.  
The second principal component provides a measure of divergence between the 
core and periphery groups, roughly a kind of spread between the core and periphery 
countries (see Longstaff et al. 2011, p.81) As such, it can be interpreted as the risk 
involved in investing in core bonds relative to the risk of investing in periphery bonds. 
As explained earlier, an increasing divergence between the core and periphery groups 
indicates an increasing probability of a sovereign default and/or euro exit within the 
periphery group. From that point of view, the core-periphery divergence is directly 
linked to the concept of crisis’ transmission through the two channels (periphery-to-core 
and periphery-to-periphery transmission) described above.  
 Figure 7 plots the first two estimated principal components for the period 1999-
2010. Focusing on the second principal component, we can infer that starting from early 
2009 the two groups are decoupled, with the risk of periphery countries relative to the 
core ones increasing rapidly. Furthermore, it should be noted that the first principal 
component has also been rising since early 2010 indicating the possibility of 
transmission from the developing periphery crisis. Overall, the movements of the 
second principal component in Figure 7 provide clear evidence for core-periphery 
relative risk divergence since early 2009, which in association with the recent increase 
in the first principal component, and on the basis of our arguments above, renders the 
former variable an appropriate proxy for transmission effects. In our empirical models 
variable pc2t, which is defined as minus the second principal component, is used to 
capture the transmission effects.
12
 If the latter are present then pc2t is expected to enter 
the empirical models of spread determination with a significantly positive sign.  
 [Figure 7] 
 
                                                          
12
 Increases in pc2t indicate higher periphery risk. The negative sign of the second pricipal component in 
the definition of pc2t is an adjustment for the fact that periphery countries load negatively in the former. 
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3.4.    Panel estimation results 
We start our econometric investigation by estimating benchmark models for 
equation (1) and its extensions for the full sample period without allowing for possible 
structural breaks. The results from our 2SLS estimations are reported in Table 2. In all 
reported specifications spreads appear to be highly persistent. We also obtain 
statistically significant coefficients with the theoretically expected signs for the 
international risk factor and growth conditions. Liquidity conditions are significant with 
the appropriate sign in three out of four specifications. The multiplicative term 
involving past spreads and illiquidity is significant in the two specifications it has been 
used with a positive sign, suggesting the presence of market forces that increased 
spreads beyond their equilibrium value. On the other hand, the role of expected fiscal 
fundamentals appears limited. Specifically, public debt and the ratio of long-term debt 
to total debt are not significant; squared debt is significant but with the wrong sign; 
while the fiscal balance is significant with the right negative sign only in two out of four 
specifications. Finally, real exchange rates and the principal component capturing 
transmission effects are not significant. Overall, some of the findings reported in Table 
2 are consistent with our a priori expectations while others are not.  
[Table 2] 
We now seek to improve upon the benchmark specifications reported in Table 2 
by examining the extent to which the determination of spreads has changed between the 
pre- and post-crisis periods, as well as during different stages of the crisis. To that end, 
we repeat our estimations accounting for slope dummies differentiating between three 
periods, namely the period preceding the global financial crisis (1999.01 – 2007.07), the 
early crisis period (2007.08 – 2009.02) and the latter crisis period (2009.03 – 2010.12). 
Table 3 reports the 2SLS estimation results. Column (1) presents the results from the 
baseline model described by equation (1) including the time slope-dummies. Compared 
to the models presented in Table 2, spreads’ persistence is lower yet still high, as 
indicated by the estimate of the autoregressive parameter while international risk, 
liquidity conditions, fiscal fundamentals and transmission effects are all priced during 
the credit-debt crisis period. The point in time where these links become active is not 
the same for all the variables, indicating different responses to the different phases of 
the crisis. For instance, the international risk factor coefficient becomes positive and 
statistically significant since August 2007, indicating that higher international financial 
volatility has been associated with higher spreads since the onset of the global credit 
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crisis. On the other hand, the coefficient associated with bond market liquidity 
conditions becomes statistically significant only since March 2009.  
[Table 3] 
Regarding the expected fiscal position, it appears that markets price the expected 
budget balance position throughout the entire sample period, with the (positive) reaction 
of spreads to budget deficits however becoming much stronger (relevant overall 
coefficient more than doubles) since March 2009. On the other hand, the expected debt 
ratio starts being positively reflected in spreads only since March 2009. Overall, 
expected fiscal deterioration is more heavily penalised by the markets during the latter 
part of the sample period, which captures the escalating sovereign debt crisis.  
The March 2009 slope dummy associated with pc2t is positive and significant 
indicating that during the debt crisis transmission effects  have led to higher spreads. 
During to the credit crisis the coefficient of pc2t is negative and significant at the 10% 
level, however the sum of the two slope-dummy coefficients is positive, indicating that 
transmission effects have overcompensated the mispricing of the early-crisis period. 
Finally, real exchange rates and economic growth are not significant in this 
specification. 
Column (2) adds to our specification the share of long-term to total government 
debt. This becomes statistically significant during the crisis period. The two slope 
dummy variable coefficients exhibit opposite sign but their sum is negative indicating 
that overall, a higher long-term share of debt is associated with lower spreads.
13
 It 
appears then that the ability to successfully issue and place increasing amounts of long-
term debt in the market is associated with lower borrowing costs, with the ratio of long-
term to total debt thereby operating as a credibility indicator.  
While the effect of the long-term share of debt on spreads is significantly negative 
since March 2009, as well as overall, the coefficient of the slope dummy variable 
associated with the August 2007 break is positive. This indicates that between the 
summer of 2007 and the spring of 2009, the decrease in the share of long-term debt to 
total debt was not penalised by the markets in the form of higher spreads.
14
 This finding 
can be interpreted within the ‘flight to safety’ trading that took place during the credit 
crisis and saw a massive rebalance of portfolios at global level, away from falling 
                                                          
13
 The Wald test F-statistic indicates that the null hypothesis of zero sum of the two slope dummy variable 
coefficients can be rejected at the 10% level of significance. 
14
 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that in most euro area countries the long-term share of debt declined 
since August 2007. 
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equities and towards government debt securities. It is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction by Favero et al. (2010) according to which in crisis periods investors choose 
from a reduced set of alternative investment opportunities, limiting their willingness to 
move away from government debt securities. In the process of fleeing the stock market 
and given an environment of high uncertainty which did not favour long-term 
commitment of funds, investors increased their demand for liquid short term 
instruments, such as Treasury bills. At the same time, sovereign bond issuers had an 
incentive to increase short term debt issuance in order to avoid locking themselves into 
(the prevailing at the time) high long-term borrowing costs. Finally, compared to 
column (1), the findings relating to the rest of the variables in column (2) remain 
unchanged, with the exception of evidence (at the 10% level) of real exchange rate 
mispricing.  
Column (3) adds into the empirical specification the product of the past bond yield 
spread and the past bid-ask spread. We find that this is statistically significant only since 
March 2009 with a negative sign, indicating that after the effect of all other 
determinants of spreads has been accounted for, spreads are lower as compared to what 
the increasingly stressed bond market conditions would imply. This finding is in 
contrast to the findings in Table 2 and suggests the existence of demand that helped 
bond prices from falling further. Compared to column (2) the rest of the findings remain 
unchanged, with two important exceptions. First, real exchange rates now appear to be 
statistically significant with the expected positive sign since March 2009. Second, 
growth conditions are significant at the 10% level with the expected negative sign since 
August 2007.  
Finally, column (4) presents the results from a parsimonious specification 
obtained by moving from the general specification presented in column (3) towards a 
more specific model including statistically significant variables only. This specification 
confirms that markets started pricing the international risk factor after the onset of the 
global credit crunch in summer 2007 and liquidity risk only during the latter part of the 
European debt crisis. We also find that markets were mispricing transmission risk and 
real exchange rate appreciation during the pre-crisis period, but have switched their 
pricing behaviour since March 2009, with both variables taking their theoretically 
expected positive and negative sign respectively. Fiscal fundamentals also appear to 
increase in significance during the crisis period: We find that markets have been 
penalising higher expected deficits throughout our sample period but started pricing the 
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stock of public debt only since March 2009. Furthermore, since March 2009 a decrease 
in the long-term component of total public debt is associated with higher spreads. 
Growth conditions are also priced since summer 2007. Finally, none of the 
multiplicative terms involving past spreads and illiquidity is statistically significant.  
All in all, the findings in Table 3 suggest that since the onset of the global 
financial crisis in summer 2007 markets have gradually moved to a pricing model that is 
much more compatible with theoretical expectations. Furthermore, the menu of 
macro/fiscal fundamentals priced by the markets has been becoming richer as the crisis 
evolves. Therefore, compared to the models reported in Table 2, which did not account 
for structural change, the models reported in Table 3 offer superior information 
regarding the determinants of sovereign bond spreads in the euro area, especially for the 
crisis period. This is also reflected in their superior model fit, as suggested by the 
notable reduction (by approximately 20%) in the standard error of the regressions 
compared to their (no-breaks) counterpart models reported in Table 2.  
 
3.5.  Sovereign ratings and spreads 
One of the aspects of the European sovereign debt developments that have been 
extensively debated is the role of credit ratings in determining intra-EMU government 
bond yield spreads. In efficient markets, and as long as credit ratings/outlook 
announcements are determined on the basis of publicly available information, they 
should not be a statistically significant determinant of spreads. Nevertheless, a number 
of European policy makers have suggested that sovereign downgrades by the credit 
rating agencies have been a significant factor in the crisis’ initiation and escalation.15 
Moreover, previous empirical evidence indicates that sovereign credit ratings and 
outlook announcements have had a statistically significant impact on spreads (see e.g. 
Afonso et al., 2012). Hence, to account for the role of credit rating agencies in the 
determination of spreads, in this section we repeat the panel estimations of section 3.4 
adding to the set of explanatory variables the average credit rating and outlook scores. 
We measure credit ratings and outlook announcements by the simple average rating and 
                                                          
15
 For example, in July 2011 the President of the European Commission suggested that Portugal’s 
downgrade was fuelling speculation in financial markets, while the German Finance Minister called for 
limits to be put on credit rating agencies (Reuters, 2011). See also Featherstone (2011) for a discussion of 
the role of the credit rating agencies in the initial phase of the Greek debt crisis, and the European 
Commission (2010) for proposals regarding an overhaul of the regulatory framework governing the 
operation of credit rating agencies.  
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outlook score provided by each of the three main rating agencies, namely Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.  
The results are reported in Table 4.
16
 Column (1) presents a general model, 
including all the variables used to explain spreads in section 3.4 plus average credit 
ratings and outlooks respectively. Average ratings are statistically significant during the 
pre-crisis period, with their significance increasing further during since March 2009. 
Credit outlook announcements, on the other hand, are not significant. International risk, 
transmission risk, fiscal fundamentals as well as liquidity conditions remain statistically 
significant, particularly during the crisis period.
17
 This pattern is more obvious in 
column (2), which reports the estimates of a parsimonious model obtained from 
applying a general-to-specific estimation approach to the general model reported in 
column (1). Note that compared to the latter, the set of significant variables includes the 
real exchange rate, confirming our previous finding of the latter’s mispricing during the 
pre-crisis period and its theory-consistent pricing during the crisis.  
[Table 4] 
Overall, our findings in Table 4 suggest that the role of credit rating agencies in 
spreads determination within the euro area is relevant. Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
ratings and outlook announcements into our models does not result in any significant 
improvement of the models’ fit and explanatory power, suggesting that even after 
controlling for the effect of ratings/outlook announcements, the main drivers of intra-
EMU spreads continue to be macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals, transmission risk, 
international risk and liquidity conditions. Hence, downgrades by the credit rating 
agencies have played a real yet mitigated role in explaining spread developments.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
In this paper we studied the determinants of long-term government bond yields in 
the euro area. We employ a panel of ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) using monthly data over 
the period 1999:01-2010:12. We investigate the role of an extended set of potential 
spreads’ determinants, namely macroeconomic and expected fiscal fundamentals, 
                                                          
16
 The results from models  that use individual credit ratings and outlook scores are available upon 
request. The qualitative inference obtained using individual agency scores is identical to the one obtained 
using average scores, with the latter, however, resulting in higher adjusted R
2
 coefficients.  
17
 Note that in the parsimonious specification, projected debt is statistically significant in the second 
power. 
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international risk, liquidity conditions, sovereign credit ratings, and the risk of the crisis’ 
transmission among the EMU members. After estimating benchmark models not 
accounting for structural change, we repeated our analysis allowing for differences in 
spreads determination between  three distinct time periods: first, the period preceding 
the global credit crunch (1999.01 – 2007.07); second, the period during which the 
global credit crunch had not yet mutated into a sovereign debt crisis (2007.08 – 
2009.02); and third, the period during which the global financial crisis mutated into a 
sovereign debt crisis (2009.03 – 2010.12). 
Our empirical findings indicate that the determinants of government bond 
spreads in the euro area have changed significantly over time. This marked shift in 
market pricing behaviour is evident not only since the onset of the global financial crisis 
in summer 2007, but also within different stages of the crisis, namely before and after 
spring 2009. More specifically, we find that during the pre-crisis period macro- and 
fiscal-fundamentals are generally not significant in explaining spreads. By contrast, 
since summer 2007 the movements of macro and fiscal fundamentals explain spread 
movements well and in a way consistent with theoretical expectations. Furthermore, the 
menu of fundamentals which appear statistically significant in explaining spreads is 
enriched since spring 2009, suggesting that markets are now pricing risks which they 
did not consider previously, even well within the crisis period. These include the risk of 
crisis transmission among the countries of the European periphery, as well as from the 
periphery countries to the countries of the European core. We also find that in contrast 
to the pre-crisis period, the size, liquidity and maturity of debt issuances are now being 
priced by markets. Finally, we find that sovereign credit ratings are statistically 
significant in explaining spreads, yet relative to macro- and fiscal fundamentals, their 
role has been rather limited.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Principal component analysis of government bond yield spreads  
 
Note: Principal component analysis is carried out over the time period 1999.01-2011.01 (T=143). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Modelling bond yield spreads, 2SLS 
 
 
Note: The regression models are estimated over the time period 1999.02-2010.11 (T=142). The panel 
members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain (N=10). Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) fixed effects panel estimates, which account for 
endogeneity, are reported. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second and third lag of 
the dependent variable and the first three lagged values of the independent variables. Colum 1 reports the 
estimates from the baseline model, while Column 3 reports the estimates from the fully specified model. 
Column 4 reports the estimates of the parsimonious model that results from applying the general-to-
specific approach to the fully specified model. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 
10% level respectively.  
 
Number Eigenvalues 
Cumulative 
proportion 
Eigenvectors 
(Loadings) 
First principal 
component 
Second principal 
component 
1 8.193 0.819 Austria 0.315 0.330 
2 1.477 0.967 Belgium 0.343 0.070 
3 0.121 0.979 Finland 0.278 0.458 
4 0.058 0.985 France 0.336 0.160 
5 0.049 0.990 Greece 0.290 -0.424 
6 0.034 0.993 Ireland 0.323 -0.265 
7 0.022 0.995 Italy  0.340 -0.058 
8 0.019 0.997 Netherlands 0.295 0.422 
9 0.016 0.999 Portugal  0.307 -0.380 
10 0.011 1.000 Spain  0.327 -0.273 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sprit-1 0.990 *** 0.989 *** 0.944 *** 0.933 *** 
vixt 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.042 *** 0.046 *** 
pc2t 0.000 0.000 0.000  
bait 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 * 
qit 0.022 0.049 0.046  
balanceit -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 ** -0.005 *** 
debtit 0.000 0.000 0.000  
gindit -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** 
ltsdebtit  0.070 0.030  
sprit-1* bait-1   0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
debtit
2 
   -1.04E-05 * 
N*T 1420 1420 1420 1420 
Adj-R
2
 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Standard error of regression 0.125 0.124 0.131 0.131 
. 
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Table 3: Modelling bond yield spreads, accounting for structural change 
 
 
Note: The regression models are estimated over the time period 1999.02-2010.11 (T=142). The panel 
members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain (N=10). Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) fixed effects panel estimates, which account for 
endogeneity, are reported. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second and third lag of 
the dependent variable and the first three lagged values of the independent variables. The dummy 
variables D2007.08 and D2009.03 which are equal to one from August 2007 and March 2009 onwards, 
respectively, and zero otherwise were also included as intercept dummies. Colum 1 reports the estimates 
from the baseline model, while Column 3 reports the estimates from the fully specified model. Column 4 
reports the estimates of the parsimonious model that results from applying the general-to-specific 
approach to the fully specified model. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
sprit-1 0.890 *** 0.890 *** 0.871 *** 0.880 *** 
vixt 0.007 0.006 0.004  
vixt*D2007.08t 0.078 ** 0.090 ** 0.094 ** 0.150 *** 
vixt*D2009.03t 0.078 0.063 0.061  
pc2t 0.001 0.002 -0.003  
pc2t *D2007.08t -0.030 * -0.037 ** -0.032 ** -0.029 *** 
pc2t *D2009.03t 0.047 *** 0.054 *** 0.055 *** 0.064 *** 
bait 0.000 0.000 0.000  
bait*D2007.08t 0.001 0.000 0.000  
bait *D2009.03t 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 
qit -0.154 -0.176 * -0.160 -0.220 *** 
qit*D2007.08t 0.239 0.326 0.045  
qit *D2009.03t 1.044 1.059 1.541 ** 3.403 *** 
balanceit -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 ** 
balanceit *D2007.08t 0.003 0.003 0.004  
balanceit *D2009.03t -0.011 ** -0.009 ** -0.010 **  
debtit 0.000 0.000 0.000  
debtit *D2007.08t 0.000 0.000 0.000  
debtit *D2009.03t 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
gindit 0.000 0.000 0.000  
gindit *D2007.08t -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 * -0.003 *** 
gindit *D2009.03t 0.000 0.000 0.001  
ltsdebtit  -0.032 -0.042  
ltsdebtit *D2007.08t  0.349 *** 0.355 *** 0.346 ** 
ltsdebtit *D2009.03t  -0.504 *** -0.510 *** -0.577 *** 
sprit-1* bait-1   -0.001  
sprit-1* bait-1*D2007.08t   0.003  
sprit-1* bait-1*D2009.03t   -0.002 *  
N*T 1420 1420 1420 1420 
Adj-R
2
 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Standard error of regression  0.107 0.107 0.108 0.106 
. 
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Table 4: Modelling bond yield spreads controlling for average credit ratings and average 
credit outlook scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The regression models are estimated over the time period 1999.02-2010.11 (T=142). The panel 
members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain (N=10). Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) fixed effects panel estimates, which account for 
endogeneity, are reported. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the second and third lag of 
the dependent variable and the first three lagged values of the independent variables. The dummy 
variables D2007.08 and D2009.03 which are equal to one from August 2007 and March 2009 onwards, 
respectively, and zero otherwise were also included as intercept dummies. Column 1 reports the estimates 
from the fully-specified model augmented by average rating and average outlook, while Column 2 reports 
the estimates of the parsimonious model that result from applying the general-to-specific approach to the 
most extended model. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level respectively.  
 
 
 (1) (2) 
sprit-1 0.799 *** 0.745 *** 
vixt 0.016  
vixt*D2007.08t
 
0.116 *** 0.289 *** 
vixt*D2009.03t 0.043   
pc2t -0.009  
pc2t *D2007.08t -0.021  
pc2t *D2009.03t 0.044 *** 0.046 *** 
bait -0.001 -0.003 *** 
bait*D2007.08t 0.000  
bait *D2009.03t 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 
qit -0.146 -0.417 *** 
qit*D2007.08t 0.801 2.001 *** 
qit *D2009.03t -0.586  
balanceit -0.008 *** -0.012 *** 
balanceit *D2007.08t -0.001  
balanceit *D2009.03t -0.021 *** -0.018 *** 
debtit -0.001  
debtit *D2007.08t 0.000  
debtit *D2009.03t 0.000  
gindit -0.001  
gindit *D2007.08t -0.002  
gindit *D2009.03t 0.002   
ltsdebtit 0.065  
ltsdebtit *D2007.08t 0.260 ** 0.882 *** 
ltsdebtit *D2009.03t -0.379 *** -1.561 *** 
sprit-1* bait-1 0.005 0.006 *** 
sprit-1* bait-1*D2007.08t -0.001  
sprit-1* bait-1*D2009.03t -0.003 * -0.006 *** 
debtit
2 
0.000 1.11E-05 * 
average ratingit -0.032 ** -0.024 ** 
average ratingit *D2007.08t -0.018  
average ratingit *D2009.03t -0.046 *** -0.100 *** 
average outlookit -0.014  
average outlookit *D2007.08t 0.024  
average outlookit *D2009.03t 0.051  
N*T 1420 1420 
Adj-R
2
 0.97 0.97 
Standard error of regression  0.105 0.111 
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Figure 1: 10-year government bond yield spreads 
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Figure 2: German 10-year government bond yield and VIX 
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Figure 3: Expected budget balance as percentage of GDP 
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Figure 4: Expected debt as percentage of GDP 
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Figure 5: Average credit rating 
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Figure 6: Average bid-ask spread in periphery and non-periphery countries 
 
 
Note: Periphery countries include Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Non-periphery countries include 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy and Netherlands. 
 
 
Figure 7: Principal components of 10-year government bond yield spreads 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Data definition and sources 
 
Variable Sample Description      Source 
spr 1999.01-2011.01 10 year government bond yield (differential vs. Germany) ECB/Reuters 
vix 1999.01-2011.01 (Log of) S&P 500 implied stock market volatility index (VIX) Bloomberg 
pc2 1999.01-2011.01 (Minus) Second principal component of spread Own calculations 
ba 1999.01-2011.01 10 year government bond bid-ask spread ECB 
q 1999.01-2010.12 (Log of) CPI based real effective exchange rate  IMF 
balance 1999.01-2011.01 Expected budget balance/GDP (differential vs. Germany)  European Comission 
debt 1999.01-2011.01 Expected debt/GDP (differential vs. Germany) European Comission 
gind 1999.01-2010.11 Industrial production annual growth (differential vs. Germany)   IMF 
ltsdebt 1999.01-2011.01 Long-term/Total general government debt  ECB 
D2007.08 1999.01-2011.01 Dummy variable: 1 from 2007.08 onwards, zero otherwise Own calculations 
D2009.03 1999.01-2011.01 Dummy variable: 1 from 2009.03 onwards, zero otherwise Own calculations 
rating 1999.01-2010.12 Credit rating (Fitch, Moody’s, S&P, Average of three agencies) 1/ 
outlook 1999.01-2010.12 Credit outlook (Fitch, Moody’s, S&P, Average of three agencies) 1/ 
1/ Afonso, A., Furceri, D. and Gomes, P. (2012). 
 
Table A2: S&P, Moody’s and Fitch rating systems 
 
Characterization of debt and 
issuer (source: Moody’s) 
 Rating Linear 
transformation 
  S&P Moody’s  Fitch  
Highest quality 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
g
ra
d
e 
AAA Aaa AAA 17 
High quality 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16 
AA Aa2 AA 15 
AA- Aa3 AA- 14 
Strong payment capacity 
A+ A1 A+ 13 
A A2 A 12 
A- A3 A- 11 
Adequate payment capacity 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8 
Likely to fulfil obligations, 
ongoing uncertainty 
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
v
e 
g
ra
d
e 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 
BB Ba2 BB 6 
BB- Ba3 BB- 5 
High credit risk 
B+ B1 B+ 4 
B B2 B 3 
B- B3 B- 2 
Very high credit risk 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+  
 
 
 
1 
 
CCC Caa2 CCC 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
Near default with possibility 
of recovery 
CC Ca CC 
  C 
Default 
SD C DDD 
D  DD 
  D 
 
. 
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Figure A1: Share of long-term debt in total general government debt 
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